Lisa Kunz v. R. R. Donnelley and Sons, Co., Sedgwick James of Idaho and Industrial Commission of Utah : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1995
Lisa Kunz v. R. R. Donnelley and Sons, Co.,
Sedgwick James of Idaho and Industrial
Commission of Utah : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Brad Betebenner; Richards, Brandt, Miller and Nelson; attorney for respondent; Allen Hennebold;
Industrial Commission of Utah; attorney for respondent.
David N. Mortensen, Sherlynn White Penstermaker, Ivie and Young; attorneys for petitioner.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Kunz v. Donnelley, No. 950690 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1995).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/6914
UlAHCOUHlUr 
BRIEF 
TAH 
OCUMENT 
FU 
D 
MO 
DOCKET NO. 
SLED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
MAY 2 8 1996 
Marilyn M. Branch 
Clerk of the Court 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LISA KUNZ, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
R.R. DONNELLEY & SONS, CO. and 
SEDGWICK JAMES OF IDAHO, and 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
Case No. 94-0757 
Oral Argument 
Priority No. 7 
95-0690-Cft 
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF THE FINAL DECISION 
AND ORDER OF THE UTAH INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
Brad Betebenner 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
50 South Main, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Attorney for Respondent R. R. Donnelley 
Allen Hennebold 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
160 East 300 South, #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorney for Respondent Industrial Commission 
David N. Mortensen, #6617 
Sherlynn White Fenstermaker, #1057 
IVIE & YOUNG 
48 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LISA KUNZ, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
R.R. DONNELLEY & SONS, CO. and 
SEDGWICK JAMES OF IDAHO, and 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
Case No. 94-0757 
Oral Argument 
Priority No. 7 
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF THE FINAL DECISION 
AND ORDER OF THE UTAH INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
Brad Betebenner 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
50 South Main, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Attorney for Respondent R. R. Donnelley 
Allen Hennebold 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
160 East 300 South, #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorney for Respondent Industrial Commission 
David N. Mortensen, #6617 
Sherlynn White Fenstermaker, #1057 
IVIE & YOUNG 
48 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
ARGUMENT . 
I. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S CONCLUSION RELIES ON A 
MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE LAW AND AS A RESULT THE 
COMMISSION'S APPLICATION OF THE LAW IS NOT REASONABLE OR 
RATIONAL 
II. THE SNOW AND ICE UPON WHICH MS. KUNZ FELL CONSTITl. ITED A 
SPECIAL HAZARD 
III. ANY EVIDENCE THAT THE RAMP PROVIDED A SAFER 
ALTERNATIVE ROUTE WAS INSUBSTANTIAL; IN ANY EVENT, THE RAMP 
DID NOT CONSTITUTE AN ALTERNATIVE ROUTE MATERIAL TO THE 
SPECIAL HAZARDS EXCEPTION 
THE ELEMENTS OF THE SPECIAL HAZARDS EXCEPTION ANNOUNCED IN 
SOLDIER CREEK DECISION HAVE BEEN MET 
CONCLUSION 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases Cited: 
Bountiful Brick Co. v. Industrial Comm. of Utah. 
68 Utah 600,251 P. 555 (1926) 6,10-12 
Cherne Construction v. Posso. 
735 P.2d 384 (Utah 1987) 7 
Cudahy Packing Co. v. Industrial Comm.. 
60 Utah 161,207 P.148 (1922) 6,12 
Jones v. Wendy's of Tri-State Mall. 
1996 WL 30239 (Del. Super. Jan. 23,1996) 4 
Park Utah Consolidated Mines v. Industrial Comm.. 
103 Utah 64,133 P.2d 314 (1943) 4-6 
Soldier Creek Coal Co. v. Bailey. 
709 P.2d 1165 (Utah 1985) 7,11 
Stokes v. Board of Review of the Industrial Comm. of Utah. 
832 P.2d 56 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) 2 
VanLeeuwen v. Industrial Commission of Utah. 
901 P.2d 281 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) 2 
Wilkinson v. Industrial Comm.. 
23 Utah 2d 428,464 P.2d 589 (1970) 7 
Statutes and Rules Cited: 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-16(1) (1994) 2 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45 (1994) 2 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4) (1994) 13 
ii 
State of Dtah 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Michael O. Leavitt 
Governor 
Stephen M. Hadley 
Chairman 
Thomas R. Carlson 
Commissioner 
Colleen S. Colton 
Commissioner 
i H 
:
 12 w 1996 
COU^T , J (.^tr**, 5£AIS 
Apr i l 11 , 1996 
Marilyn M. Branch 
Court Clerk 
Utah Court of Appeals 
230 South 500 East, #400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Re: Kunz v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co.. et al. 
Court of Appeals Case No. 950690-CA 
Dear Ms. Branch: 
The Industrial Commission of Utah, a respondent in the above 
referenced matter now pending before the Court of Appeals, hereby 
adopts the arguments set forth in the brief of respondent 
Donnelley, which brief was filed with the Court on March 28, 1996. 
UTAH COURT OP APPEAL 
BRJfiF 
JTAH 
DOCUMENT 
< F U 
>0 
DOCKET MO °6mbfj\ 
Very t r u l y yours , 
(\U\ _A*U 
Alan Hennebold 
General Counsel 
I n d u s t r i a l Commission of Utah 
le t ters \4- l l (2) 
cc. David N. Mortensen Alan L. Hennebold 
Brad C. Betebenner General Counsel 
160 East 300 South, 3rd Boor, P.O. Box 146600, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6600 
Telephone (801) 530-6953 1-800-530-5090 TDD (801) 530-7685 FAX (801) 530-6804 
State of Utah 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
AiSjlM., 
Michael O. Leavitt 
Governor 
Stephen M. Hadley 
Chairman 
Thomas R. Carlson 
Commissioner 
Colleen S. Colton 
Commissioner 
^a *i i 
. ' I i3? ijr.f-'TSai \:Ujg& 
1996 
QQUM >EAIS 
Apr i l 11 , 1996 
Marilyn M. Branch 
Court Clerk 
Utah Court of Appeals 
230 South 500 East, #400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Re: Kunz v, RtRt Donnelley & Sons Co., et alt 
Court of Appeals Case No. 950690-CA 
Dear Ms. Branch: 
The Industrial Commission of Utah, a respondent in the above 
referenced matter now pending before the Court of Appeals, hereby 
adopts the arguments set forth in the brief of respondent 
Donnelley, which brief was filed with the Court on March 28, 1996. 
Very truly yours, 
UiAHCO 
UTAH 
DOC ^ENT 
K F U 
50 
Ah) 
DOGKF " 
URTOFAPPEAiS 
BRHEF 
^mmrh 
ALU JJA 
Alan Hennebold 
General Counsel 
I n d u s t r i a l Commission of Utah 
let ters\4-l l (2) 
CC. David N. Mortensen Alan L. Hennebold 
Brad C. Betebenner General Counsel 
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor, P.O. Box 146600, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6600 
Telephone (801) 530-6953 1-800-530-5090 TDD (801) 530-7685 FAX (801) 530-6804 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S CONCLUSION RELIES ON A 
MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE LAW AND AS A RESULT THE 
COMMISSION'S APPLICATION OF THE LAW IS NOT REASONABLE OR 
RATIONAL 
R. R. Donnelly and Sedgwick Jones (hereinafter referred to as "Donnelly") admit that the 
Worker's Compensation Act, Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-1, et seq., does not expressly grant 
discretion to the commission to interpret the law. Donnelly claims that Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-
16(1) was amended in 1994 somehow effecting the Stokes v. Board of Review of the Industrial 
Commission of Utah1 decision. However, the 1994 amendment does not change the fact that the 
Industrial Commission in this case was construing Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45 which provides in 
pertinent part: 
Each employee...who is injured...by accident arising out of and in the course of his 
employment, wherever such injury occurred... shall be paid compensation.... 
Id. This Court recently reaffirmed that the Act does not expressly or impliedly grant discretion 
to the Commission to interpret this statutory language. Therefore, the Commission's 
interpretation of the Act is reviewed for correctness. VanLeeuwen v. Industrial Comm. of Utah. 
901 P.2d 281,283 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
Nonetheless, as Donnelly points out, the Industrial Commission in this case has discretion 
to apply its factual findings to the law, and the Commission's application will not be disturbed 
unless its determination exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and rationality. Id However, 
when the Industrial Commission's application of the facts to the law is predicated upon an 
*832 P.2d 56 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
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erroneous understanding of what the law is, its final determination almost of necessity exceeds 
the bounds of reasonableness and rationality. 
In this case the Industrial Commission found that a special hazard was not associated 
with the route taken by Ms. Kunz. Both the ALJ and the Industrial Commission 
misapprehended the law when they found it relevant that (1) ice and snow in northern Utah in 
January is a common fact of life, (2) there was no evidence that the condition at the site of Ms. 
Kunz's accident was different than conditions elsewhere in Provo, and (3) that it was a natural 
result that outdoor sidewalks, stairs, and ramps were slick. The controlling law in Utah provides 
that the above stated factors should have been irrelevant to the Industrial Commission's 
determination. Therefore, the Industrial Commission and the ALJ attempted to apply law which 
does not exist. 
Likewise, the Industrial Commission's holding that an alternate and substantially more 
safe route was available is neither sustainable by controlling law nor as a factual finding is the 
conclusion sustainable under the evidence. Since the stairs were the normal and more direct 
route to the front door, Ms. Kunz's use of the route was closely associated with her employment. 
As a result, her injury arose out of and was in the course of her employment. 
Because the Industrial Commission and the ALJ applied the wrong law to the facts, their 
application of an erroneous legal premise was by definition beyond the bounds of reasonableness 
and rationality. 
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II. THE SNOW AND ICE UPON WHICH MS. KUNZ FELL CONSTITUTED A 
SPECIAL HAZARD 
Donnelly, like the ALJ and the Industrial Commission, ignores Utah law in its discussion 
of whether a special hazard exists in this case. Because the abundant case law cited by Ms. Kunz 
in her principal brief could not be distinguished by Donnelly, the respondent simply brushed 
aside all of the cases. While acknowledging that Ms. Kunz was arguing that common perils such 
as ice and snow can constitute a hazard under the special hazards exception, Donnelly has 
proffered no case law from any jurisdiction which holds that snow and ice is not a hazard under 
the special hazards exception because it is a common peril. Contrary to respondent's assertion, 
the simple fact that an entire city or region experiences fog, rain, ice or snow does not take the 
condition at the employee's place of employment outside the special hazards exception. See 
Respondent's brief at 16. Instead, as the court in Jones v. Wendy's of Tri-State MalL 1996 WL 
30239 (Del. Super. Jan. 23,1996) held: 
Due to the location of the employer's building within the mall parking lot, in order to get 
to work [the claimant] was forced to traverse the icy parking lot to get to work. 
IdLat3. 
As asserted in petitioner's principal brief, the Utah Supreme Court decision in Park Utah 
Consolidated Mines v. Industrial Comm.. 103 Utah 64, 133 P.2d 314 (1943) controls in this 
matter. In Park Utah, the applicant had slipped on a roadway leading to the place of her 
employment. The Park Utah court did not find it necessary that the employees uniformly 
followed the same exact route, but only that the applicant and the others uniformly traveled the 
same approximate course. It can hardly be argued in this matter that the applicant and others 
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uniformly traveled the exact approximate course where the applicant fell. There was but a single 
entrance to the building. (R. 638). In holding that the applicant was entitled to benefits, the Park 
Utah court commented: 
When the employee arrives at the threshold of his employment and the means for 
entrance are limited so that he has no choice as to the mode of entrance, all of the 
hazards which are peculiar to such entrance attach to his employment. The 
converse is equally true as to leaving the employment. The employee in this case 
had only one means of exit from the premises, although it is true that the yard 
sloping down to the public road measures approximately fifty feet in width. The 
applicant could not leave the premises from the steps to the shop for the reason 
that they were blocked by snow. It may be true that if applicant had not walked 
quite as far to the north in leaving the premises he might not have slipped or 
might not have fallen, but even if the supposition were a fact it would be wholly 
immaterial. The employees in effect had an entrance and exit fifty feet in width, 
as the only practical means of access to and exit from the premises. 
Id at 317. The same can be said of Ms. Kunz in this case. There was but one entrance to the 
building. There was a single staircase which happened to have a disabled person's ramp next to 
it. It is complete supposition and conjecture to allege that if Ms. Kunz had taken the ramp she 
would not have fallen. If Ms. Kunz had not taken the most direct route to the front door of the 
building, she may well have slipped walking along the sidewalk in order to get to the ramp. 
Likewise she could have slipped on the ramp itself as snow had accumulated there. While the 
evidence indicates that water might not accumulate as easily on the ramp, it is incontroverted 
that at the time of the accident snow was in fact upon the ramp. (R. 640). 
Both Donnelly and the Industrial Commission, as stated, rely heavily upon the fact that 
the snow and ice could be considered a common peril. The Commission held that the snow and 
ice in January is a "common fact of life." (R. 506). The Commission further held that there was 
no evidence that conditions were different elsewhere in Provo, that it is a natural result of snow 
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that sidewalks, stairs and ramps are slick,2 and that everyone in the same general area faced the 
same condition. These are simply irrelevant considerations. In Bountiful Brick Co. v. Industrial 
Comm. of Utah. 68 Utah 600, 251 P. 555 (1926), a case upon which Park Utah relies, an 
employee was killed while crossing a rail-road track to get to the Bountiful Brick plant. The 
Bountiful Brick court noted: 
The employee, in crossing the track at any time, was exposed to a peril which is common 
to all, but by virtue of his employment he was required to cross the track regularly and 
continuously thus being peculiarly and abnormally exposed to a common peril. 
Id. at 556. Likewise, while snow and ice might be natural and common in Provo in January, it 
was Ms. Kunz's employment with Donnelly which necessitated her regular and continuous 
crossing of the sidewalk and staircase at issue. The fact that the hazard was common to all is 
immaterial. Instead, the material facts which the Industrial Commission ignored along with the 
precedent of Bountiful Brick is that the reason Ms. Kunz was walking up the staircase in the first 
place was its inextricable connection with her workplace. 
Donnelly's assertion that the special hazards exception does not apply to common perils 
or hazards to which the public is exposed wholly ignores the holding in Cudahy Packing Co. v. 
Industrial Comm.. 60 Utah 161, 207 P. 148 (1922), which was the first decision to recognize the 
exception to the going and coming rule. In Cudahy. the hazard was a railroad crossing, which 
while mostly traversed by employees of Cudahy, was open to the public and the record in fact 
showed public use of the area. Even under those conditions, the exception applied and benefits 
were awarded. 
2It is important to note that the Industrial Commission assumed that the ramp itself would 
be slick. 
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Donnelly claims that the Utah Supreme Court in Soldier Creek Coal Company v. Bailey> 
709 P.2d 1165 (Utah 1985) found that the elements of the special hazard exception could not be 
satisfied because there was no "special hazard." This was not the holding of the court. The 
Soldier Creek court noted: 
Nothing in the police report or the testimony of any witnesses suggest that the curve was 
in anyway dangerous. 
Id. at 1167. Thus, as the Utah Supreme Court later pointed out in Cherne Construction v. Posso. 
735 P.2d 384 (Utah 1987), the Soldier Creek court found the special hazards exception 
inapplicable because "there is no evidence to suggest that the curve in the road caused Bailey's 
accident." Id at 385 (quoting Soldier CreeL 709 P.2d at 1167).3 In this case, however, the 
evidence is undisputed that Ms. Kunz fell on ice on the steps leading to the door of the place of 
her employment and that her fall caused her injuries. Therefore, it is completely unrebutted that 
the hazard, the snow and ice, caused the accident. 
Because the ALJ and the Industrial Commission's conclusion relied on a false 
understanding of what the law is, its application of the law was erroneous. The Industrial 
Commission and the ALJ ignored Utah precedent and as a result the Industrial Commission's 
conclusion should be vacated and the matter remanded for determination of the amount of 
benefits to be awarded. 
likewise in Wilkinson v. Industrial Comm.. 23 Utah 2d 428, 464 P.2d 589 (1970) the 
holding of the court was that no hazard caused the accident. 
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III. ANY EVIDENCE THAT THE RAMP PROVIDED A SAFER ALTERNATIVE 
ROUTE WAS INSUBSTANTIAL; IN ANY EVENT, THE RAMP DID NOT 
CONSTITUTE AN ALTERNATIVE ROUTE MATERIAL TO THE SPECIAL 
HAZARDS EXCEPTION 
In this matter there really was not an alternative route. Had the ramp been attached and 
completely parallel to the steps, it could hardly be argued that it would constitute an alternative 
route. In this case there is but a single entrance. Even if this Court were to consider the ramp an 
alternative route, there is no evidence that it was safer on the day of the accident. As the court in 
Park Utah pointed out, while it may be true that an applicant could have walked a litter further 
one way or the other, such supposition is wholly immaterial. Park Utah. 133 P.2d at 317. 
Instead, this Court must look at the totality of the evidence and determine if there is substantial 
evidence to support both the Industrial Commission is factual finding and their application of the 
law to that factual finding. 
The record does contain some evidence of the viability of the ramp as an access way to 
the front door of Ms. Kunz's employment. The ramp was located "thirty feet [from the] stepped 
pathway." (R. 478). The ramp had hand rails. (R. 752). The ramp was made of a smooth 
surface and water would normally drain more efficiently from that surface. (R. 752). The ramp 
had a gradual slope. (R. 752). It had snowed approximately one half inch to one inch the night 
before, and that the snow had been partially cleared from the walks. (R. 667). However, the 
snow had not been cleared from the ramp, nor had it been cleared from the walk leading from the 
sidewalk to the steps. (R. 639). As stated, the Industrial Commission found that the ramp was 
probably slick. (R. 506). Ms. Kunz understood that the stairs constituted the regular route taken 
by employees. (R. 644). In fact, as far as Ms. Kunz knew, the stairs constituted the only route 
8 
the petitioner and other employees used. (R. 644). The only other witness, Karen LaFramboise, 
testified that both the ramp and stairs had been used by employees in the past and the area 
generally gets slippery with inclement weather. (R. 752). Ms. La Framboise indicated that she 
used the ramp "if I can get that far." (R. 754). Donnelly claims that Ms. Kunz has taken that 
statement out of context. However, the context is freely available for the appellate court to 
review. The statement indicates that at some times Ms. LaFramboise cannot get that far. In any 
event, the foregoing constitutes a complete marshaling of the evidence in support of the 
Industrial Commission's conclusion that the ramp provided an alternative and that that 
alternative was substantially safer. However, despite this evidence and any reasonable inferences 
that can be drawn therefrom, the finding that the ramp was either an alternative route or 
substantially safer is not supported by substantial evidence. 
A review of the pictures attached to both the Ms. Kunz and Donnelly's briefs show that 
the ramp was indeed farther from the entrance to the place of employment than the stairs. The 
stairs, from the direction the petitioner was coming, constituted a far more direct route to the 
front door. Likewise, the stairs have handrails. In fact, Ms. Kunz indicated that she tried to grab 
the handrail as she fell. (R. 641). The Industrial Commission concluded in an unreasonable and 
irrational fashion that instead of taking a more direct route and more convenient route to the front 
door of her place of employment, crossing upon flat surface steps, Ms. Kunz should have 
traversed a sloping ramp which was covered with snow. It is unreasonable to expect a reasonable 
person to take a longer route on a slippery surface and increase the likelihood of falling. The 
ramp was not more level than the steps, as the Industrial Commission found (R. 506), it was not 
more convenient, and it was not substantially safer. This Court need only look at the pictures in 
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evidence in order to conclude that under no standard of reasonableness can the Industrial 
Commission's conclusion that the ramp was more level be sustained. 
In the final analysis, the stairs and ramp constituted a single entrance. When Ms. Kunz 
parked her car and attempted to make her way to the only entrance to her employment, she took 
the most direct route following the sidewalk. Had she fallen but two paces prior to where she did 
fall, there would be no need to make artificial distinctions between what really constituted a 
single entrance. The entire area, the access way to the building, had not been cleared of snow. If 
the whole area gets slippery as Donnelly's witness Ms. LaFramboise indicated (R. 752), then 
walking further along the sidewalk and up the ramp would constitute a higher potential for 
slipping and falling. In fact, had Ms. Kunz taken the route suggested by Donnelly and fallen, 
Donnelly would now be arguing to this Court that it was unreasonable for her to not take the 
most direct route of the stairs and thus diminish the possibility of her falling. 
The Bountiful Brick court styled the employer's argument as follows: 
The main contention made by the plaintiffs is that there was a route or a way available to 
the employee along the Burn's road and the public street, which, altogether greater in 
distance, was less hazardous because the crossing of the rail-road track was a public one 
where the trains must be operated with greater care to avoid accidents and injuries[.] 
Bountiful Brick. 251 P.2d at 556. In rejecting this argument, the Bountiful Brick court noted: 
The route taken was the most direct and shortest and was used by other employees, with 
the knowledge of the employer who made no objection. 
Id. In this case, Ms. Kunz took the most direct and shortest route, a route which to her 
knowledge was the normal route which employees took. In Bountiful Brick the court found that 
the decedent had "traveled over the route which was generally used by other employees- the 
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natural, practical, customary route." Id Likewise in this case Ms. Kunz took the natural, 
practical, and customary route. 
The fact that Ms. Kunz could have deviated in one direction or another does not change 
the fact there was but a single entrance to her place of employment, and that if she had taken the 
ramp in question, that circuitous route would have increased, not diminished, her chances of 
slipping. The Industrial Commission's conclusion that the ramp is more level than the stairs is 
simply untenable. Likewise, it is pure supposition that Ms. Kunz would have been safer by 
taking the ramp which was sloped and covered with snow. 
Donnelly's argument that holding for Ms. Kunz in this case would extend benefits to all 
employees in inclement weather from the doorsteps of their homes finds no basis in reality. As 
the court in Bountiful Brick pointed out, it is not the common peril which makes a hazard a 
special hazard of employment. Instead, as the Soldier Creek court pointed out: "There must be a 
close association of the access way with the employer's premises." Soldier Creek. 709 P.2d at 
1166. It cannot be reasonably argued that there is not a close association of the stairs in this case 
and the employers premises. A review of the photographs attached to both parties' briefs 
evidences that the stairs were but a few feet from the entrance to the building. The Industrial 
Commission's Order must be reversed and the matter remanded. 
IV. THE ELEMENTS OF THE SPECIAL HAZARDS EXCEPTION ANNOUNCED 
IN THE SOLDIER CREEK DECISION HAVE BEEN MET IN THIS CASE 
If the Industrial Commission had applied a correct understanding of the law, it would 
have found that the elements of the Soldier Creek decision had been met. There was a close 
association of the access way with the employers business. There was but one door to the 
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building. The petitioner was taking the most direct route from her vehicle to that door. It cannot 
be reasonably argued that the stairs did not constitute the normal access way to that door under 
the evidence of this case. 
There was a special hazard associated with the access way to Ms. Kunz's place of 
employment, which hazard was the snow and ice. The undisputed evidence before the Industrial 
Commission showed that Ms. Kunz did in fact slip on snow and ice. There is absolutely no 
evidence that Ms. Kunz could have avoided the hazard by taking an alternative route. If she had 
walked further along the sidewalk to access the ramp, she could have slipped there. Likewise, it 
is pure supposition that had she walked further along the sidewalk or taken the ramp she would 
not have slipped. The sloping ramp was covered with snow. Utah law is inapposite to the 
Industrial Commission's conclusions. Snow and ice in Utah can constitute a hazard. 
Ms. Kunz was exposed to the hazard because of the use of the route. The stairs were but 
a few feet away from the front door. Lastly, the proximate cause of the fall was the ice and 
snow. This point is undisputed. Accordingly, the proximate cause of the injuries to the 
employee in this case was a special hazard associated with the access way to the employer's 
business. Both the Park Utah and Bountiful Brick cases clearly establish precedent that a natural 
element or common peril does not bring a hazard out of the special hazards exception. A denial 
of benefits to Ms. Kunz is inconsistent with the Utah Supreme Court's decisions in Cudahy. 
Bountiful Brick, and Park Utah. The Industrial Commission simply misunderstood the law. 
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CONCLUSION 
Because the Industrial Commission misunderstood the law, it has denied Ms. Kunz 
benefits pursuant to the Workers' Compensation laws of the State of Utah. The Industrial 
Commission failed to construe the Workers Compensation Act in favor of the employee, and by 
the denial of benefits, Ms. Kunz has been substantially prejudiced. As a result, and pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4), the Industrial Commission's Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law must be reversed and the matter remanded for determination of the amount of benefits to 
be awarded. 
DATED AND SIGNED this of May, 1996. 
DAVID N. MORTENSEN 
SHERLYNN WHITE FENSTERMAKER 
IVIE & YOUNG 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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